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Abstract We demonstrate, for the first time, a secure optical network architecture that combines NFV 
orchestration and SDN control with quantum key distribution (QKD) technology. A novel time-shared 
QKD network design is presented as a cost-effective solution for practical networks. 
Introduction 
Network function virtualization (NFV) promises 
significant network infrastructure simplification 
as current hardware appliances are replaced 
with software running on standard servers. NFV 
is complemented by software-defined 
networking (SDN), provisioning the required 
network connectivity to respond to newly 
instantiated appliances by aligning network 
topologies in an automated manner. However, 
there are security risks associated with NFV 
deployment. In an NFV enabled network 
infrastructure, network functions are stored 
centrally as software images in a remote data 
center (DC) where they can be cloned, 
transferred and deployed as virtual functions on 
commodity servers (replacing network 
appliances) across the network. This transfer of 
network functions must be secured, as any 
attempt to tamper with NFV can create a 
significant security breach. For instance, if a 
transmitted software image of a network function 
contains any sensitive information, such as a 
firewall, its interception and/or alteration can 
compromise an entire network. 
 Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a 
contemporary approach to the generation of 
symmetric keys [1]. In QKD, keys are distributed 
by transmitting single photons from a sender 
(Alice) to a receiver (Bob) over a quantum 
channel, which is usually a fibre optic channel. 
Fundamental laws of physics prevent an 
eavesdropper (Eve) from learning the key, as 
any attempts Eve makes to gain information 
about the photons will irreversibly change them 
in a manner that can be readily detected. An 
additional benefit of QKD is that keys generated 
in this manner can be considered future-proof 
from hacking, since they are random rendering 
any future mathematical attacks ineffective. 
 Building on these principles, we propose and 
experimentally demonstrate, for the first time, 
the inclusion of QKD to tackle NFV’s security 
problems. More importantly, utilizing SDN 
technology, we present a cost-efficient method 
for time-sharing the QKD systems and 
demonstrate the ease in which these systems 
can be integrated with an NFV platform. 
NFV-QKD platform description 
The ETSI NFV management and orchestration 
(MANO) architecture [2] is organized into three 
layers: the orchestrator, virtual network function 
(VNF) managers, and the virtual infrastructure 
manager (VIM). Existing solutions approach the 
functional distribution in several different ways 
or are not completed, due to a lack of 
standardization. Here, we define and implement 
a prototype of the ETSI NFV architecture for 
distributed DCs (Fig1(a)). Our approach splits 
the architecture into a centralized orchestrator 
(CO) acting in master node and different ETSI 
NFV stacks operating in slave mode. The CO is 
composed of a Python backend core, mySQL 
database, a GUI and RESTful interfaces that 
allow platform users and administrators to 
manage the infrastructure. The slave-mode 
stack is composed of three layers: the 
orchestrator (acting as a gateway between the 
CO and the DC hosting network functions), the 
VNF managers, and the VIM, which manages 
virtual machines (VMs) and Linux containers 
(based on OpenStack and Docker, respectively).  
 In the proposed NFV architecture, images of 
network functions are stored within the CO’s 
trusted DC where an Alice sender unit is also 
located. To virtualize these network functions, 
their images must be cloned and securely 
transmitted to remote servers with Bob receiver 
units. To achieve secure transmission, our NFV 
MANO architecture has been integrated with an 
ID Quantique QKD system (ID3100 Clavis2) [3], 
as shown in Fig.1a. When an image needs to be 
transmitted, the CO asks for a key from the Alice 
using the proprietary IDQ3P protocol, before the 
advanced encryption standard (AES) symmetric 
key algorithm encrypts the image, informing the 
remote platform of the transmission and the key 
ID needed for image decryption. While we use 
the standard AES algorithm, one-time pad 
(OTP) could easily be used for mission critical 
transmissions. The workflow is shown in Fig1(c). 
Time-shared QKD network based on SDN 
As shown in Fig1(b), our novel QKD enabled 
NFV architecture is proposed in an SDN 
controlled optical network. This enables us to 
implement a network control mechanism 
supporting QKD resource sharing. We 
implemented a new QKD resource scheduling 
method, enabling a single physical Alice to be 
time-shared between multiple endpoints (Bobs) 
allowing the establishment of multiple secure 
connections using fewer QKD devices than 
would normally be required. This method 
reduces the cost of the proposed secure NFV 
architecture because of the significant reduction 
in hardware, and also allows a design in which 
the most sophisticated components can be 
contained within the Alice unit, while deploying a 
number of low-priced Bob units. Fast scheduling 
of optical connections is achieved by using 
SDN, which is also employed to synchronize the 
QKD units, together with the remote NFV stacks 
and the NFV orchestrator. This scheduling is 
undertaken assuming that the QKD channels 
and the classical data channels are multiplexed 
in space (i.e. carried over different fibers). The 
scheduling process can be summarized as 
follows: i) The NFV orchestrator identifies the 
Bob nodes requiring to share a particular Alice 
node, ii) The scheduling mechanism utilizing 
information extracted from the network SDN 
controller creates the required end-to-end 
connectivity for the Alice/Bob pairs by 
establishing optical connections between the 
Alice and every Bob, one connection at a time 
and sequentially, iii) the key servers are started 
and stand by until the QKD initialization process 
is finished, iv) The NFV orchestrator extracts the 
generated keys from both QKD units, keeping 
them with identification by the key ID extracted 
from the response message. 
Experimental test-bed 
Our time-shared QKD test-bed comprises four 
nodes, as shown conceptually in Fig1(b). This 
testbed comprises one Alice device in Node 1, 
together with a key server which is time shared 
with three Bob devices (Nodes 2 to 4) and their 
key servers. In each node, keys can be 
extracted for use in a number of different 
protocols, such as AES or OTP. The Alice/Bob 
nodes are connected via a dynamic, and 
reconfigurable circuit switched optical network. 
The network comprises a 25ms-switching, large-
port count programmable and SDN-enabled 
(with OpenFlow extensions) beam-steering 
optical switch (Polatis). This is partitioned into 
multiple smaller interconnected switches 
emulating a network. The optical network and 
the switch are used for directing both standard 
and quantum signals between nodes. The 
Alice/Bob units, operating at 1552nm, are 
controlled by separate servers using a software 
suite designed for automated hardware 
operation and key distillation. In the test-bed, the 
QKD and classical data channels are always 
running in separated fibers. This test-bed is 
equipped with three servers running the 
proposed NFV architecture stack, the SDN 
controller for the optical network and the QKD 
device scheduling mechanism. 
Experimental results 
The results from our time-shared QKD network 
are shown in Fig. 2. Fig 2(a) shows the 
measured average initialization time for each 
Alice/Bob pairs, i.e. the time taken for 
synchronization, characterization of the setup 
and generation of the first set of keys. The 
measured average initialization time increases 
with distance between Alice/Bob pairs in a 
double exponential function, as shown by the 
curve fitted (R2 = 0.9999). For the back-to-back 
(BtB) case, the average initialization time is 400 
s, increasing to 1265 s at 25 km, an increase of 
around threefold, indicating that as the distance 
(and power penalty) increases, the time taken to 
initialize becomes substantially larger. This 
 
Fig 1: (a) The proposed ETSI NFVI architecture on a QKD enabled optical network test-bed, (b) QKD key extraction, encryption & 
transmission workflow, (c) Logical representation of the experiment, QKD-Alice is time shared between three QKD-Bobs 
result is particularly useful when time-sharing 
the Alice unit, as it allows a sensible estimate of 
the delays encountered when cyclically 
communicating between different Bob units. For 
enabling longer distances, a multi-hop approach 
could be considered using additional trusted 
nodes. Fig 2(b) shows the secret key rate as a 
function of distance. The mean values are 
represented by the circular marker, while the 
maximum and minimum values are shown as 
error bars. The secret key rate in the BtB 
scenario is ~4 kb/s, while in the 25 km case the 
rate drops to ~0.1 kb/s, due to the additional 
attenuation. The attenuation itself is shown in 
Fig. 2(c) on the right hand axis which, as 
expected, displays an approximately linear 
response. Fig. 2(c) also shows the quantum bit 
error rate (QBER), on the left hand side. In line 
with the other results shown, the longer the 
distance between Alice/Bob nodes the higher 
the QBER, affecting the secret key rate with 
approximately linear proportionality. A QBER of 
5.3% is reached for a QKD pair of over 25km of 
standard single-mode fibre (SSMF). 
 Regarding image transmission between the 
nodes, our setup was composed of three Dell 
PowerEdge T630 servers (one hosting the 
orchestrator and scheduling mechanism, one 
hosting the ETSI NFV stack in slave mode and 
one hosting the SDN controller), running 1310 
nm 10G SPF interfaces, allowing the servers to 
communicate through our optical network (note 
any wavelengths can be used here since the 
data and quantum channels are carried over 
separate fibres). As shown in Fig 2(e), the 
transmission of the 16 GB Windows Server 
image by encrypting (126 s), sending through a 
standard socket (33 s) and decrypting (144 s) 
takes ~305 s (which may vary depending on the 
computational load of the server), while by using 
secure file transfer protocol transmission takes 
~405 s. Fig. 2(d) shows the capture of 
messages exchanged for the VNF transmission 
to the remote DC, as shown previously in Fig. 
1(c). The first message initiates the workflow, 
before the orchestrator creates the required 
network connectivity for the transmission by 
sending CFlow_mod OpenFlow messages to 
the Polatis switch through OpenDaylight 
(highlighted in red). The orchestrator requires 
the key from the Alice unit to encrypt the image 
and sends it to the remote DC by using a 
standard TCP socket (highlighted in green). To 
finalize the process, the orchestrator informs the 
image and key IDs to be used for the decryption, 
sending an ACK (HTTP 200) when the process 
is finished. Some messages (IDQ3P response, 
TCP) are omitted to improve readability. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, NFV orchestration over SDN-
controlled optical networks with advanced 
quantum-key-distribution systems is shown for 
the first time. A particular ETSI-NFV inter-DC 
architecture is designed on a QKD capable 
optical network test-bed with a novel SDN-
based QKD resource scheduling method for 
time-sharing a single QKD-Alice between 
multiple Bob units. Results demonstrate that a 
SSMF link of up to 25km long can be secured 
supported by Quantum encryption with 
simultaneous NFV and SDN control, with a 
minimum QBER of 5.3%. 
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